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Disruptive Construction or Constructive 
Destruction? 
Reflections on the Appellate Body Crisis 
Henry Gao 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University; gaohenry@gmail..com  
Abstract   
Over the past few months, the blockage of the Appellate Body appointment process 
by the United State (hereinafter U.S.) has emerged as the biggest existential threat to 
the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO). In response to the criticisms from 
other WTO Members, the U.S. justified its action as a way to raise people’s attention 
on long-standing problems in the Appellate Body (hereinafter AB). Are the U.S. 
criticisms valid? Even if assuming that the U.S. allegations are correct, is the specific 
approach that the U.S. has taken legitimate? Drawing from both the treaty text and 
jurisprudence of WTO law, this Chapter argues that the U.S. criticisms, especially 
those concerning the systemic issues in WTO dispute settlement, are deeply flawed. 
Moreover, the paper also argues that, regardless of the validity of the substantive 
claims of the U.S., the U.S. has chosen the wrong approach by holding hostage the 
entire AB appointment process. The paper concludes with practical suggestions on 
how to overcome the AB crisis and restore its functions. 
Key words: Appellate Body, Dispute Settlement, Stare Decisis, Precedent, 
Common Law, Civil Law.  
1. Disruptive Construction: The U.S. Criticisms 
The U.S. blockage started on 11 May 2016, when the U.S. government 
announced that they would block the reappointment of AB member Prof. Seung Wha 
Chang. In a joint statement issued by Deputy United States Trade Representative 
(hereinafter USTR) Michael Punke and USTR General Counsel Tim Reif, the U.S. 
stated that: 
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[T]he United States is strongly opposed to Appellate Body members 
deviating from their appropriate role by restricting the rights or expanding 
the obligations of WTO Members under the WTO agreements . . . . The 
United States will not support any individual with a record of restricting 
trade agreement rights or expanding trade agreement obligations. 1  
At the Dispute Settlement Board (hereinafter DSB) meeting held later the same 
month, the U.S. explained its actions by naming four reports in which Prof. Chang 
allegedly “add[ed] to or diminish[ed] the rights and obligations provided in the 
covered agreements.”2 In three of the four reports, the U.S. accused Prof. Chang of 
addressing issues which were moot (Argentina — Financial Services), not appealed 
(India — Agricultural Products), or not raised by parties (US — Countervailing 
Measures (China)).3 According to the U.S., these amounted to obiter dicta as they 
are not related to “issues necessary to resolve the dispute”.4 As to the fourth report 
(US — Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)), the U.S. claimed that 
the AB has adopted “a very problematic and erroneous approach to reviewing a 
Member’s domestic law” by “substitut[ing] the judgment of WTO adjudicators for 
that of a Member’s domestic legal system as to what is lawful under that Member’s 
domestic law”.5 
However, the U.S. opposition turned out to be short-lived, as the U.S. agreed to 
the launch of the appointment process for the vacancy left by Prof. Chang. On 23 
November 2016, Mr. Hyun Chong Kim of Korea was appointed as the successor to 
Prof. Chang.6 
After Donald Trump took the office of U.S. president in January 2017, however, 
things started to take wrong turns. 2017 witnessed the departure of two AB members, 
i.e., Mr. Ramirez-Hernandez and Prof. Van den Bossche, whose terms expired on 30 
June 2017 and 11 December 2017 respectively. Initially, the selection process for 
their replacements were held up as WTO Members debated over whether a single 
 
1 Caporal J (2016) Debate Erupts over US Blocking Korean Appellate Body Reappointment. Inside 
U.S. Trade. https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/debate-erupts-over-us-blocking-korean -appellate-
body-reappointment. 
2 Mission of the United States, Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (23 May 2016), 1, 12-13. DSB. https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/290/May23.DSB_.pdf. These four reports: Appellate Body Report, Argentina 
– Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/AB/R and Add.1 (adopted 9 May, 
2016), at 431; Appellate Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products, WT/DS430/AB/R (adopted 19 June, 2015), at 2459; Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R 
(adopted 16 Jan 2015), at 7; and Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1 (adopted 22 July 
2014), at 3027. 
3 Id. at 13–15. 
4 Id. at 15. 
5 Id. 
6  WTO Appoints Two New Appellate Body Members, World Trade Organ (23 Nov 2016). 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/disp_28nov16_e.htm.  
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selection process or two separate processes should be launched.7 When a consensus 
started to emerged in June 2017, the U.S. indicated that it “was not in a position to 
support the proposed decision to launch a process to fill a position on the Appellate 
Body that would only become vacant in December 2017” due to “the ongoing 
transition in the U.S. political leadership and the recent confirmation of a new U.S. 
Trade Representative”. 8  In July, however, the U.S. softened its approach by 
announcing that “despite the ongoing transition in its political leadership, it had 
received guidance that it would be acceptable to launch a process given the expiry of 
Mr. Ramírez’s second term on 30 June 2017.”9 
Then on 1 August 2017, Mr. Kim tendered his resignation with immediate effect 
as he was tapped to be Korea’s Minister of Trade, a position he formally assumed 3 
days later.10 When the DSB reconvened later that month, the U.S. raised several 
concerns. First, Mr. Kim had been a member of the AB division in the appeal on 
“European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols 
from Indonesia (DS442)”, the report of which would only be issued on 5 September 
2017. 11 Since the report would bear the name of Kim, who would no longer be an 
AB member by then, the U.S. is concerned with a potential violation of Article 17.1 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (hereinafter DSU), which stated that “three 
[AB members] shall serve on any one case”. Similarly, Mr. Ramírez was serving on 
the same appeal, even though his term had expired on 30 June 2017.12 Thus, when 
the AB report is circulated, only one signatory would still be a sitting AB member. 
The U.S. considered these to be “unprecedented circumstances” and urged the DSB 
to “consider the implications and decide how to handle this situation”. Moreover, in 
addition to this dispute, Mr. Ramírez also continued to serve on 2 other appeals after 
expiration of his term13 pursuant to Rule 15 of Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review, which provides that  “A person who ceases to be a member of the Appellate 
Body may, with the authorization of the Appellate Body and upon notification to the 
DSB, complete the disposition of any appeal to which that person was assigned while 
a member”. While recognizing the expediency of the Rule, the U.S. argued that the 
power to appoint and reappoint an AB member remained the prerogative of the DSB 
according to Article 17.2 of the DSU.  
In summary, the U.S. insisted that the DSB should consider these systemic issues 
first before moving forward with the AB appointment process. 14  When other 
Members criticized the U.S. for linking up the two seemingly separate issues, the U.S. 
defended its position by stating that these are all part of its “long-standing concerns 
 
7 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 20 
February 2017, para 11, WT/DSB/M/392 (20 Feb 2017). 
8 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 19 June 
2017, para 8.3, WT/DSB/M/398 (19 June 2017). 
9 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 20 July 
2017, para 5.14, WT/DSB/M/399 (20 July 2017). 
10 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 31 
August 2017, para 5.1, WT/DSB/M/400 (31 Aug 2017). 
11 Id. at para 5.3.  
12 Id. at para 5.4.  
13 Id. at para 5.5.  
14 Id. at para 7.3.  
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frequently expressed in the DSB” and “simply moving forward with filling vacancies 
risked perpetuating and leaving unaddressed the concerns that the United States 
believed required the urgent attention of the DSB”.15  
In the ensuing months, the U.S. continued its blockage of the AB selection 
process, but its “long-standing concerns” regarding the AB remained elusive. These 
concerns were finally spelt out in detail when the USTR published the 2018 
President’s Trade Policy Agenda on 28 February 2018.16 Since then, these concerns 
have been repeated by the U.S. in several DSB meetings,17 including most recently 
the DSB meeting on 25 February 2019.18 
So far, the U.S. criticisms have been dropped like a laundry list every time they 
were mentioned and the U.S. has shown no intention to organize then in a meaningful 
way. In an effort to make some sense out of the U.S. concerns, I have grouped them 
into three areas: 
1. Procedural issues: These include the AB’s disregard of the 90-day deadline 
for appeals,19 and the AB’s frequent reference to Rule 15 since 2017 to allow the 
continued service of AB members on appeals even after their terms have 
formally expired.20  
2. Substantive issues: These are mainly issues arising from decisions of panels 
and the AB which the U.S. regarded as adding to or diminishing the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members under the WTO Agreements. 21  Some of the 
leading examples include prohibition of zeroing practices in antidumping, the 
“public body” jurisprudence in subsidies and countervailing duties, the addition 
of “unforeseen development” requirement in safeguards, and consideration of 
factors unrelated to national origins when deciding whether a treatment is “less 
favourable” under Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter 
TBT) Agreement. 
3. Systematic issues: The U.S. also identified systemic problems relating to the 
judicial approach of the AB. For example, the AB has required the panels to treat 
their reports essentially as precedents and follow them absent “cogent reasons”.22 
Another related problem is the increasing tendency of the AB to issue “obiter 
 
15 Id. at para 7.11.  
16 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018) USTR’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 
2017 Annual Report. AMERICA’S TRADE POLICY. http://americastradepolicy.com/ust rs-2018-trade-
policy-agenda-and-2017-annual-report/.  
17 See for example, Mission of the United States (29 Oct 2018) Statements by the United States at 
the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 1, 53–54. DSB. https://geneva.usmission.gov/w 
p-content/uploads/sites/290/Oct29.DSB_.Stmt_.as-delivered.fin_.rev_.public.pdf; Mission of the 
United States (21 Nov 2018), Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, 1, 38-39. DSB. https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Nov2 
1.DSB_Stmt _.as-deliv.fin_.public.pdf.  
18 Mission of the United States (25 Feb 2019) Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 1, 12–14. DSB. https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/290/Feb25.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.public.pdf. 
19 Id. at 24–25.  
20 Id. at 25–26.  
21 Id. at 22–24.  
22 Id. at 28.  
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dicta” or “advisory opinions” which are unnecessary to resolve disputes. 23 
According to the U.S., such practices lack proper basis under the DSU and 
encroach on the exclusive power of the Ministerial Conference and General 
Council to “make laws” and adopt interpretations. The U.S. also raise concerns 
regarding the AB’s review of the factual findings of the panel, which goes 
against the DSU as Article 17.6 explicitly limits the scope of appeals to legal 
issues only.24 Similarly, the AB regards the meaning of a Member’s domestic 
measure as a matter of law reviewable on appeal, while the U.S. argues that it 
should be a matter of fact and thus non-reviewable by the AB.25  
To be fair, many of the U.S. criticisms are not illegitimate and they do raise 
important questions under WTO law. However, in my view, it is one thing to say that 
what the AB did was wrong, it is a totally different matter to expect a solution to the 
issue just by pointing figures at the AB. To start with, some of the problems are not 
of the AB’s own creation. Take the procedural defects identified, for example. The 
disregard of the 90-day limit is because the deadline is simply impossible to meet in 
many cases due to the complexity of the legal issues and human resources constraints 
of the AB and its Secretariat. Similarly, Rule 15 was also introduced on grounds of 
expediency, as involving another AB member would only cause further delay to the 
appeal process. The proper solutions to these problems should have been increasing 
the resources available to the AB or, if that is not possible, relaxing the 90-day rule. 
As to the complaints on the substantive jurisprudence of the AB, I would note, first 
of all, that not all WTO Members share the U.S. view that these decisions are wrong. 
Even if we, for the purpose of argument, assume that there indeed are some 
jurisprudences that all WTO Members regard as problematic, the more appropriate 
action should be seeking official interpretation by the WTO General Council or 
Ministerial Conference. One might argue that this is not possible due to the difficulty 
for WTO Members to achieve consensus in recent years, but then it is a problem with 
the legislative branch of the WTO that should not be blamed on the AB.  
The systemic issues, however, are much more difficult to tackle. This is because 
they reflect deeper questions about the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Moreover, issues of judicial approach are often part of the judicial style of a tribunal, 
and it is hard to dictate rules beforehand without severely limiting the judicial 
discretion accorded to the tribunal. In this Chapter, I will address these issues by first 
discussing whether the WTO has a system of precedents, then analysing whether the 
current WTO rules prohibit “obiter dicta” or “advisory opinion”.26  
2. A System of Precedents? 
 
23 Id. at 26–27.  
24 Id. at 27.  
25 Id. at 27–28.  
26 Some of the arguments in the following sections are based on Gao (2018), p. 509–33. 
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There are two possible ways to argue that the WTO has a system of precedents. 
The first is arguing that the WTO legal system adopts the Common Law system, 
which implies the existence of a precedent system as it is a hallmark of Common 
Law. Even if this argument does not work, one may still argue that the WTO has rules 
allowing precedents. In this section, I will prove that neither argument is valid.   
2.1 Common Law System? 
It has long been debated whether the nature of WTO dispute settlement system 
is more similar with the Common Law System or Civil Law System. In my view, the 
WTO dispute settlement system has, on balance, more resemblance with the Civil 
Law System for the following reasons.  
First, the main difference between the two legal systems lies in the source of law. 
While Civil Law countries only recognize formal legislation as the only source of 
law, Common Law jurisdictions tend to include judicial decisions or judge-made law 
as a source as well.27 In the WTO, the paramount role of formal legislations has been 
repeated ad nauseam. These legislations are known, in the WTO parlance, as 
“covered agreements”, i.e., agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU.28 In the 
DSU, the phrase “covered agreement” appeared 72 times in the main text and seven 
times in the Appendixes and footnotes in either singular or plural forms. The key 
provision is Article 3.2, which emphasizes that the purpose of the dispute settlement 
system is “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements”. It also warns that the DSB “cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements” in its recommendations and rulings, 
which is repeated verbatim in Article 19.1. Similarly, according to Article 7.1 and 11, 
the function of the panel is confined to examine the consistency of the challenged 
trade measure with the relevant provisions in the “covered agreements”. Such slavish 
reliance on legislations can only be found in the Civil Law system.  
The second difference is the role of the judge. While Common Law judges 
assume an active role as potential law-maker, the role of the judiciary in Civil Law 
countries is reduced to that of a technical29 or even grammatical30 interpreter within 
rigid parameters because of the monopolization of the law-making power by the 
legislature.31 This approach is grounded in the idea that the Codes provide a complete 
and perfect set of legal text that can encompass “all cases that life could possibly 
offer”32 and judges are “merely applying pre-existing rules—the rules laid down in 
 
27 See Dainow (1966-1967), pp. 423–24. See also Sacerdoti (2011), p. 4. 
28 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute art. 1.1, 15 Apr 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 hereinafter DSU and Appendix 1 of the DSU. 
29 Dainow, supra note 27, at p. 421.  
30 Lasser (1995), p. 1327. 
31 Sacerdoti, supra note 27, at p. 4. 
32 Benayas (1982), p. 1645. 
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the code”.33 Again, such an approach is adopted by the WTO legal system, which 
does not recognize any source of law other than the sacred “covered agreements”. 
The role of a WTO panel, according to Article 11.1 of the DSU, is to make “an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity 
with the relevant covered agreements”. The wordings suggest that all that a WTO 
panel needs to do is to mechanically apply the covered agreements and then 
determine the conformity of the challenged measure accordingly. Indeed, it could 
even be argued that, strictly speaking, WTO panel and Appellate Body do not even 
have the power to “interpret” the covered agreements. Instead, according to Article 
3.2 of the DSU, they only have the power to “clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law”. On the other hand, one could argue that such approach is naive 
and unworkable and may even point to the reference to “legal interpretations 
developed by the panel” under Article 17.6 as an implicit acquiescence of the 
interpretive power of the panel. But any faith one might place on such implicit 
interpretive power must be severely shattered in the face of the explicit warning under 
Article 3.9 that “[T]he provisions of [the DSU] are without prejudice to the rights of 
Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement 
through decision-making under the WTO Agreement”. In other words, here the WTO 
legal system is again taking the traditional Civil Law approach. One could even say 
that it is much stricter than that of most modern Civil Law countries, and only falls 
an inch short of the explicit ban on the interpretive power of judges by the Roman 
emperor Iustinianus in his Codex.34 
Third, another key difference between Common and Civil law systems is 
whether the judicial decisions are made on a collective or individual basis. In Civil 
Law jurisdictions, “judicial decision is rendered by the entire court as a unit” with 
judges remain “anonymous”. 35  Individual opinions such as “[d]issenting and 
concurring opinions are forbidden”36 or at least discouraged.37 In contrast, a defining 
feature of Common Law courts decisions is the “personalisation” of views38, with 
each judge given the freedom to expound on his own point of view.39 Indeed, it could 
even be said that a Common Law judgment is “the sum of the decisions of the 
individual judges”.40 While the WTO legal system does not directly address the issue, 
we can find the following hints pointing to stronger influence from the Civil Law 
system: 
A. Under the DSU, strictly speaking, it is not the panel or the AB which decides 
individual disputes. Their role is limited to making recommendations to the 
 
33 Posner (2008), p. 144.  
34 Sacerdoti, supra note 27, at n.11.  
35 Dainow, supra note 27, at p. 432; D. Terris et al. (2007), p. 123.  
36 Lasser, supra note 30, at p. 1342.  
37 Sacerdoti, supra note 27, at p. 4. 
38 Id.  
39 Dainow, supra note 27, at p. 432. 
40 Terris et al., supra note 35, at p. 123. 
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DSB,41 which is the WTO Membership acting on a collective basis.42 As argued 
by Debra Steger: 
[T]he Appellate Body only has jurisdiction for a particular appeal once a 
notice of appeal has been submitted to the DSB, and that jurisdiction is lost 
once its report has been circulated and adopted by the DSB. It does not have 
any continuing jurisdiction outside of these periods during particular 
appeals. There is no true separation of powers in the WTO. The DSB (a 
political body) governs the dispute settlement system: it decides to establish 
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports (which have no legal status 
until they are “blessed” by the DSB) and authorize suspension of 
concessions.43 
In other words, “[i]t is the DSB that makes decisions, and the role of the 
Appellate Body is to advise the DSB on what to do”.44 Thus, “[t]heir status is 
clearly subsidiary to that of the Dispute Settlement Body”.45 Such approach 
could not be further from the individualist approach in the Common Law system.  
B. In the DSU, reference to the panel or AB decision in a given case always 
refer to “the report”, implying that it is the decision by the panel or AB as a whole 
rather than the sum of individual opinions. The Working Procedure of the AB 
made this explicit, by stating that the AB shall “make every effort to take their 
decisions by consensus”46 as the appellate process is a collegial process that is 
designed to “ensure consistency and coherence in decision-making, and to draw 
on the individual and collective expertise of the Members”.47 One may argue that 
this is not the case, as Article 17.1 of the DSU states that only three out of seven 
AB members shall “serve on any one case” as a Division. However, one should 
not mistake this to mean that the other four Members play no role as there is the 
practice of “Exchange of Views”, 48  whereby “the division responsible for 
deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other Members before the 
division finalizes the appellate report for circulation to the WTO Members”.49 
To ensure even members who are not part of a Division would make meaningful 
contributions, the Working Procedures also explicitly state that “each Member 
shall receive all documents filed in an appeal”. As explained by former AB 
Secretariat Director Valerie Hughes and former AB Chairman Claus-Dieter 
 
41 See e.g., Art. 11 of the DSU, which states that “[t]he function of panels is to assist the DSB in 
discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements”. 
42 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. IV:2 & 3, 15 Apr 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S.154 hereinafter WTO agreement.  
43 Steger (2017), p. 448.  
44 Matsushita (2017), supra note 43, at p. 548.  
45 Bartels (2004), p. 864.  
46 WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, at Rule 3(2), WT/AB/WP/6, 
(16 Aug 2010). 
47 Id. at Rule 4(1).  
48 Hughes (2004), pp. 127–28. 
49 WTO Appellate Body, supra note 46, at Rule 4(3). 
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Ehlerman, such exchange of views is not merely rubberstamping the decision of 
the Division but has been “of enormous benefit to the work of the Appellate 
Body” by allowing Divisions “to draw on the individual and collective expertise 
of all members”.50 This is confirmed by the first AB Secretariat Director Debra 
Steger, who noted that: 
[i]n one particular early appeal, the exchange of views took five days, 
including two days during which the Appellate Body members listened with 
tremendous respect to a member who was not part of the division for that 
particular case as he tried several different ways to convince the division of 
his point of view.51 
C. Under the DSU, there is no explicit prohibition of dissenting or individual 
opinions like in the European Court of Justice.52 The only implicit reference to 
dissent can be found in Rule 3(2) of the Working Procedure, which states that 
the AB shall “make every effort to take their decisions by consensus”53. While 
there have been calls to allow dissenting opinions by some scholars,54  they 
remain extremely rare in both Panel and AB reports.55 In practice, as the DSB 
always adopts the panel or AB report as a whole, the Common Law approach of 
allowing individual and sometimes conflicting opinions could create difficulties 
for WTO Members. If a report with dissent is adopted, does it mean that the 
dissenting opinion is accepted by the WTO Membership as well? Thus, it seems 
safer to follow the Civil Law tradition of not allowing dissents, or at least not 
encouraging them. Steger provided some hint into the origin of the AB’s aversion 
of dissent when she noted that one of the reasons for the lack of dissents is 
because “some of [the Appellate Body members] emphasises that in their legal 
systems dissents were not common”. Apparently, these members must be from 
Civil Law countries.  
 
D. The fourth hint for the Civil Law influence can be found under Article 
14.3 and 17.11, which mandates that opinions expressed in the panel or AB 
report by individual panellists or AB members “shall be anonymous”. Instead, 
the reports are issued by the “faceless foreign judges”56 and nobody is 
supposed to know who authored particular parts of the decision. This again is a 
hallmark feature of the Civil Law system.  
 
50 Hughes, supra note 48, at pp. 127–28; Ehlermann (2002), pp. 612–13. 
51 Steger, supra note 43, at p. 453.  
52 Terris et al., supra note 35, at p. 123. 
53 WTO Appellate Body, supra note 46, at Rule 3(2).  
54 Matsushita, supra note 44, at pp. 556–57. See also Lewis, (2006), pp. 895–931. 
55 This does not mean that there are no disagreements among Appellate Body members, but the 
Appellate Body worked very hard to reach consensus. See e.g., Lacarte-Muró (2007, pp. 478–79). 
56 Bacchus (2002), pp. 1021–40. 
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2.2 System of Precedents 
While most commentators agree that the WTO dispute settlement system was 
initially designed more like a Civil Law system, many of them have argued that a 
system of precedents have been developed over time through the decisions of the 
WTO’s adjudicative bodies, especially those of the AB.57 Again, I find such view 
unconvincing. 
At the outset, we should recall, as John Jackson has pointed out, “the 
international legal system does not embrace the common law jurisprudence . . . which 
calls for courts to operate under a stricter ‘precedent’ or ‘stare decisis’ rule.”58 Thus, 
it is no surprise that most international tribunals do not follow the rule of stare 
decisis.59  Some courts explicitly reject the idea. For example, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice made it very clear that “[t]he decision of the Court has 
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”60 
While other tribunals do not have such explicit language in their constituting 
documents, they usually do not recognize the binding authority of previous 
decisions.61 There has been some suggestions that the International Criminal Court is 
different in this regard, as Article 21.2 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he court 
may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.”62 In 
my view, however, this is far from acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis, as it 
merely uses the permissive language “may”, which still falls far short of granting 
binding force to precedents.  
Similarly, the concept of precedent is also far from uncontroversial in the 
multilateral trading system. During the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereinafter GATT) era, the Contracting Parties took differing views on the issue. 
The European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC), for example, argued that 
Panel findings shall be “limited to the specific measures under examination” and 
should not have precedential effect.63 The U.S., on the other hand, argued that “when 
the Council adopted a report, those interpretations became GATT law”.64 Moreover, 
even GATT panels themselves have not recognized the precedential effect of 
 
57  See Picker (2008), p. 1083; Bhala (1998), pp. 849-850. The page seems wrong, since the 
beginning page of this article is 845. Please kindly check it. 
58 Jackson (1998), p. 178. 
59  For example, in his comprehensive review on the treatment of precedents by international 
adjudicators, former ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume notes that, while international courts 
“construct an entire jurisprudence based on their own precedent”, they all “distance themselves in 
principle from the rule of stare decisis”. Similarly, while “[t]he arbitration tribunals are . . . inclined 
to rely on precedent . . . with rather excessive zeal”, “stare decisis rule is no more applied in ICSID 
than it is in other international jurisdictional instances.” See Guillaume, (2011), pp. 7–16. See also 
Pauwelyn (2016), at n.1, which notes that “[t]he only international tribunal to date that was set up 
with a binding rule of precedent (stare decisis) is the Caribbean Court of Justice.” 
60 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, 18 Apr 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.  
61 Sacerdoti, supra note 27, at pp. 7–10.  
62 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.   
63 Chua (1998), p. 177. 
64 Id.  
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previous panel reports. For example, in the 1989 case of EEC – Restrictions on 
Imports of Dessert Apples – Complaint by Chile, the Panel refused to follow the 1980 
Panel report on EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile65, even though 
it involves “the same product and the same parties as the present matter and a similar 
set of GATT issues”.66 
When the WTO came into being, the Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council was bestowed exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the covered 
agreements. 67  With such explicit grant of the interpretive power, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that such authorities cannot be exercised by other institutions.68 
This in turn means that, in principle, the legal interpretations adopted by the Panel 
and AB do not have precedential power. Notwithstanding this, many commentators 
have argued that stare decisis does exist 69  and WTO AB reports do have 
“precedential value”.70 In the paragraphs that follows, I will investigate the validity 
of this claim with a detailed survey of the key WTO cases.  
The first WTO case to address the precedential effect of panel reports is the 1996 
case Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II. In its report, the Panel stated that “panel reports 
adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case by virtue of the decision to 
adopt them. Article 1(b)(iv) of GATT 1994 provides institutional recognition that 
adopted panel reports constitute subsequent practice. Such reports are an integral part 
of GATT 1994, since they constitute ‘other decisions of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to GATT 1947’”.71 This view was rejected by the Appellate Body, which 
noted that, first, under GATT 1947, adopted panel reports only bound “the parties to 
the dispute in that particular case”, but not subsequent panels; second, only “the 
conclusions and recommendations in an adopted panel report” are binding, but not 
the “legal reasonings” in the report.72 Citing the grant of exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations by the Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX:2 
of the WTO Agreement, the AB also held that Panel reports would not “constitute a 
definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of [covered agreements]”.73 At the 
same time, the AB also noted that “[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of 
the GATT acquis . . . often considered by subsequent panels”, which “create 
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into 
 
65 Report of the Panel, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, L/5047 (10 Nov 1980), 
GATT BISD 27S/98. 
66 Report of the Panel, European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples – 
Complaint by the United States, para 12.1, L/6513 (2 June 1989), GATT BISD 36S/135. See also 
Chua, supra note 63, at p. 178. 
67 WTO Agreement, Art. IX:2. 
68 Chua, supra note 63, at p. 174.  
69 See e.g., Bhala, supra note 57, at p. 845; Pelc (2016), at p. 177.  
70 Chua, supra note 63, at p. 195.  
71 Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R 
(adopted 1 Nov 1996), as modified by Appellate Body Report, para 6.1, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R. 
72  Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para 13, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted 1 Nov 1996).  
73 Id.  
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account where they are relevant to any dispute”.74 Even unadopted panel reports 
could provide “useful guidance” to future panels.75 However, to prevent any illusion 
on the binding effect of panel reports, the AB also made it explicit that “they are not 
binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to 
that dispute”.76  
In a way, it is not surprising that the AB took a cautious approach on the 
precedential value of panel reports in this case. The AB was barely one year old when 
the case was decided, thus it is better to avoid controversial statements so as not to 
undermine its own legitimacy as a new institution. Moreover, the AB did not address 
the precedential effects of its own reports, a question that is only answered in the 
subsequent case of US — Shrimp (Article 21.5 Malaysia). In that case, the AB 
expanded its approach in Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II in two very important ways. 
First, the AB confirmed that AB reports, just like panel reports, “provided 
interpretative guidance” for panels.77 This is not very surprising, because it is only 
natural that the AB, as the institution reviewing panel decisions, would have at least 
the same power as the panel. Second, in addition to confirming that “[t]he Panel was 
correct in using [the Appellate Body’s] findings as a tool for its own reasoning”,78 
the AB went one step further by stating that the Panel “was right to use” and “rely 
on” the “reasoning” of the AB report in US — Shrimp.79 This is one big step towards 
recognizing the precedential effect of AB reports, as the key in a precedent is its ratio 
decidendi or reasoning. Furthermore, to dispel any speculation that the reasoning in 
the AB report in US — Shrimp applied to the current case only because the two cases 
concern the same dispute on the same measure between the same parties, the AB also 
made clear that such reasoning shall be relied on by not only “the Panel in this case”, 
but also all “future panels”.80  
Some “future panels”, however, chose to ignore the AB’s edict, resulting in a tug 
of war between the panels and the AB. The most contentious battle is fought over the 
legality of “zeroing” practices by the U.S., where some WTO panels persistently 
refused to follow settled AB jurisprudence on the issue. In the US — Stainless Steel 
(Mexico) case, for example, the Panel refused to follow previous AB decisions even 
though it was aware that its reasoning is very similar to those of the two Panel 
decisions that have been overruled by the AB.81 According to the Panel, such an 
approach is mandated by Article 11 of the DSU, which requires panels to carry out 
 
74 Id. at 14.  
75 Id. at 15.  
76 Id. at 14.  
77  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, para 107, WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted 
21 Nov 2001).  
78 Id. at para 109.  
79 Id. at para 107. The report referred to here is Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted 6 Nov 
1998), at 2755.  
80 Id. 
81 Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/R (adopted 20 May 2008), as modified by Appellate Body Report, para 7.106, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted 30 Apr 2008).  
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an objective examination of the matter at issue.82 The EU, one of the third parties in 
the case, became so frustrated that it asked the AB “to unambiguously re-confirm that 
all panels are expected and therefore also obliged, to follow its rulings on these issues” 
(emphasis original).83 Their frustration is shared by the AB, which stated that they 
“are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established 
Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues”.84 
Citing the need to ensure “security and predictability” in the dispute settlement 
system in Article 3.2 of the DSU, the AB held that “[w]hile the application of a 
provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, the 
relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited 
to the application of a particular provision in a specific case.” 85  Thus, the AB 
concluded, “absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal 
question in the same way in a subsequent case.”86  
Does this statement mean that AB reports now shall be treated as binding 
precedents? While WTO Members differ widely on this issue,87 the strong wordings 
of the AB certainly provided plenty of ammunition for the claim that the WTO now 
has a system of binding precedents, or stare decisis.88 However, I think that such 
exuberance about the existence of a precedent system in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is not only irrational but also premature, as the AB itself explicitly stated, at 
the beginning of its discussion on the issue, that “[i]t is well settled that Appellate 
Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute 
between the parties.”89 Compared to the highly cautionary language used earlier, the 
AB has made it very clear, in a straightforward and unequivocal manner, that there is 
no formal or de jure system of precedents in WTO dispute settlement.90  
 
82 Id. 
83 In the World Trade Organization before the Appellate Body AB-2008-1, DS344 United States – 
Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, Third participant notification and 
written submission by the European Communities, (25 Feb 2008), para 56.  
84 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, para 162, WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted 20 May 2008) [hereinafter US – Stainless Steel 
(Mexico)]. 
85 Id. at para 161.  
86 Id. at para 160.  
87 See e.g., David’s discussion on the heated debate between WTOP Members when the Appellate 
Body Report in US – Stainless Steel was adopted. F. David (2009), pp. 8–9.  
88  See Sacerdoti, supra note 27, at p. 14; Davis C (2016) Deterring Disputes: WTO Dispute 
Settlement as a Tool for Conflict Management, 20. 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cldavis/files/davis201 6.pdf; Cho (2016), pp. 20–21; Alford R 
(2008) The Role of Precedent at the WTO. Opinion Juris. http://opiniojuris.org/2008/05/02/the-role-
of-precedent-at-the-wto/. 
89 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), supra note 84, at para 158. 
90 This view is shared by many Appellate Body insiders. For example, Unterhalter stated that “[t]he 
WTO dispute settlement system knows no formal system of precedent” in D. Unterhalter, supra note 
43, at p. 473. Matsushita stated that “in the WTO jurisprudence stare decisis is not recognized” in 
Matsushita, supra note 44, at p. 552. Hughes stated that “stare decisis does not apply in the WTO 
dispute settlement system” in Hughes, supra note 48, at p. 421. 
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Therefore, at most, one can only claim the existence of a de facto precedent 
system in the WTO, but “it is certainly not stare decisis”,91 as pointed out by John 
Jackson, who argued that: 
[the] precedent effect in the jurisprudence of the WTO . . . is not so powerful 
as to require panels or the Appellate Body considering new cases to follow 
prior cases, with the possible exception that once prior cases have been 
numerous regarding a particular issue and approach, and apparently 
accepted by all Members of the WTO, then the language of the Vienna 
Convention about “practice under the agreement,” may suggest a stronger 
impact. But short of that situation, it appears that the ‘flavor’ of the 
precedent effect in the WTO is still somewhat fluid, and possibly will remain 
somewhat fluid for the time being. 
To paraphrase Jackson, much of the confusion regarding the precedential effect 
of the panel and AB reports arose because the word “precedent” is a “complex 
concept” with “many flavors”.92 To avoid this, Jackson proposed to view the word as 
“a multi-layered concept, or at least as having a number of different approaches of 
different flavors”. However, as we can see from the foregoing discussion, such an 
approach could still lead to confusions. Instead, I would suggest ceasing to refer to 
the previous decisions of the AB as precedents, but to call them as “jurisprudence” 
instead.  
Moreover, as Beshkar and Chilton have argued, conferring binding force on AB 
reports could raise substantive systematic costs. 93  For example, WTO Members 
might rush to bring cases, or at least participate as third parties, in a bid to shape the 
jurisprudence through litigation.94 Wrong judicial precedents might perpetuate over 
time as the consensus requirement makes it difficult for the legislative branch to 
correct them.95 All these will be unfair for the small and poorer countries as they are 
less likely to participate in WTO disputes.96   
In addition to these practical reasons, I would add another very important 
constitutional reason. The Appellate Body was set up as a “safety valve”97 to check 
against “rogue” panels98 which might render “bad reports”.99 It was never meant to 
be a judicial branch that is on par with the legislative branch to safeguard the so-
called separation of powers as under some domestic legal systems. Elevating AB 
reports to the status of binding precedents could seriously undermine the nature of 
the WTO as a “Member-driven” organization.100  
 
91 Jackson (2006), p. 177.  
92 Id. at p. 173.  
93 Beshkar and Chilton (2016), pp. 386–388.  
94 Id. at pp. 386–387. 
95 Id. at pp. 387–388. 
96 Id. at p. 387.  
97 Hudec (1990), p. 191. 
98 Hughes, supra note 48, at pp. 121–122. 
99 Steger, supra note 43, at p. 447. See also Van den Bossche (2006), pp. 292–294.  
100 For discussions on WTO as a “Member-driven” organization, see Elsig (2016), pp. 345–363. 
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3. Prohibition of Obiter Dicta or Advisory Opinion? 
As I have argued above, the WTO does not have a system of precedents as it is 
not based on the Common Law system nor recognizes the concept of precedents. 
From this, it naturally follows that there is no room for obiter dicta either, as the 
concept is unique and “essential”101 to the Common Law system. According to the 
doctrine of stare decisis102 or precedents, later courts are supposed to follow the 
holdings by earlier courts.103 Without the concept of dicta, everything stated by the 
earlier courts would be binding on the later courts. This might not be a problem if the 
court always restricts itself to what is absolutely necessary for the resolution of the 
case at hand, but this is rarely the case. Instead, as has been observed by Llewellyn 
and Aldisert, judges tend to “over-state” their case “in the heat of the argument” and 
“overwrite opinions”,104 with the result that “discussion outran the decision”.105 Or 
worse still, judges may deliberately “plant” dicta to steer the development of the law 
and “preempt colleagues who might later decide a further issue in a manner not to 
our liking”.106 These concerns make it necessary to draw the distinction.  
This should have been more than sufficient to conclude the debate on “dicta” in 
WTO dispute settlement system. However, for the sake of completeness, I’d still 
analyse in detail here whether the WTO might still have rules against dicta even 
though it does not have a system of precedent. This is more than pure academic 
speculation, as many WTO Members, especially the U.S., has repeatedly referred to 
certain parts of panel reports as “dicta” in their written submissions. Moreover, in 
view of the controversy surrounding the usage of the term “obiter dicta”, the U.S. 
has, in its more recent statements, changed its wording to “advisory opinions”, which 
it defined as “a non-binding statement on a point of law given by [an adjudicator] 
before a case is tried or with respect to a hypothetical situation.”107 
This point, however, is highly contestable as what a WTO Member might view 
as “obiter dictum” or “advisory opinion” may often be a necessary link in the panel’s 
overall analysis leading to the final findings. For example, in a case involving the 
non-discrimination obligations, the panel would have to first determine if the two 
products are alike before deciding whether the measure at issue is indeed 
discriminatory. If the panel makes a negative finding on likeness, this does not mean 
that the panel should stop its analysis there, because such a finding might be 
overturned on appeal. Thus, a more prudent course of action for the panel would be 
to continue making findings on the discrimination issue, lest the AB do not have 
sufficient facts to “complete the analysis” when the likeness finding is reversed.108  
 
101 Posner, supra note 33, at pp. 192–193. 
102 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided”. However, 
there has been considerable confusion in determining what “things” have in fact been “decided”. 
See e.g., Steinman (2013), p. 1810; Abramowicz and Stearns (2005), p. 1094. 
103 McAllister (2011), p. 161; Stanford Law Review (1952), p. 513; Greenawalt (1989), p. 431.  
104 Llewellyn (1996), pp. 43–44.  
105 Aldisert et al. (2009), p. 19.  
106 McAllister, supra note 103, at p. 177.  
107 Mission of the United States, supra note 17, at p. 10. 
108 For an analysis on the issue, see Yanovich and Voon (2006), pp. 933–950. 
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Compared to the allegations from WTO Members, what is even more worrying 
is the usage of the concept of “dicta” by the AB itself in its own reports. What does 
the AB mean by “dicta” then? Again this can only be found out from the AB’s own 
words. 
The very first case where the AB mentioned dicta is the Canada – Periodicals 
case, in which the AB held that, the statement by the panel in EEC – Oilseeds109 that 
"it can reasonably be assumed that a payment not made directly to producers is not 
made ‘exclusively’ to them” is “obiter dicta” because the panel already found that 
subsidies paid to oilseeds processors were not made “exclusively to domestic 
producers”.110 However, the AB does not explain further why such statement is 
considered dicta. We can only surmise that the statement is regarded as dicta because 
it is about a moot issue.  
In the US — Shrimp (Article 21.5 — Malaysia) case, the AB told us what is not 
dicta by stating that “[t]he reasoning in our Report in United States — Shrimp on 
which the Panel relied was not dicta; it was essential to our ruling”.111 This suggests 
that dicta is something that is not essential to the ruling of the AB.  
In the US — Gambling case, the AB visited the issue again, when the parties 
debated whether the Panel’s statement on whether “practice” as such may be 
challenged as a “measure”.112 The AB ruled that, as Antigua, the Complaint, was not 
challenging a practice as such, the Panel’s statement did not constitute a “‘finding’ 
of the Panel”. Thus, the AB concluded, “the Panel's statement on ‘practice’, in our 
view, was a mere obiter dictum, and we need not rule on it.”113 Ironically, however, 
the AB followed this statement with yet another dictum on dicta, by stating that “We 
nevertheless express our disagreement with the Panel's understanding of previous 
Appellate Body decisions. The Appellate Body has not, to date, pronounced upon the 
issue of whether ‘practic’ may be challenged, as such, as a ‘measure’ in WTO dispute 
settlement.”114 
From these three cases, we can see that the AB’s main criteria for distinguishing 
dicta from holding is whether the statement at issue is relevant or essential to the 
decision. However, like with any other legal issue, the AB’s position here must be 
supported by provisions in the covered agreements. Unfortunately, the covered 
agreements do not include any explicit prohibition of dicta. Instead, the claim that 
dicta are not allowed can only be inferred from WTO provisions, as the U.S. alleged 
in their statement at the DSB meeting on 23 May 2017. According to the U.S., “more 
 
109  GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed Proteins, para 137, L/6627 (25 Jan 
1990), GATT BISD 37S/86.  
110 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, para 33, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted 30 July 1997).  
111  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted 21 
November 2001), at para 107.  
112  Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, paras 129-30, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted 20 Apr 2005). 
113 Id. at para 131.  
114 Id. at para 132. 
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than two-thirds of the Appellate Body’s analysis [in Argentina – Measures Relating 
to Trade in Goods and Services]—46 pages—is in the nature of obiter dicta” because: 
The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s findings on likeness and said that 
this reversal rendered moot all the panel’s findings on all other issues, 
including treatment no less favorable, an affirmative defense, and the 
prudential exception under the GATS. Yet, the Appellate Body report then 
went on at great length to set out interpretations of various provisions of the 
GATS. These interpretations served no purpose in resolving the dispute—
they were appeals of moot panel findings. Thus, more than two-thirds of the 
Appellate Body’s analysis is comprised simply of advisory opinions on legal 
issues.115 
As mentioned earlier, such a position is premised on the Common Law view that 
the law-making power of the court arises from its function to solve disputes, thus the 
rulings which are necessary to resolve the disputes become the holdings, while those 
which are unnecessary become dicta. Therefore, the hidden assumption of such 
argument is that the roles of the Panel and AB are limited to resolving trade disputes. 
A closer reading of the DSU reveals, however, not only there is no support for such 
a view in the text of the DSU, but also the DSU explicitly requires the panel and AB 
to go beyond merely solving disputes.  
First, according to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the WTO dispute settlement system 
serves not only to “preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements”, but also to “clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. As 
explained by Article 3.4, the first function is achieved through “prompt settlement” 
of disputes. But this apparently does not apply to the second function, as clarifications 
of treaty provisions often have to be conducted beyond the narrow confines of 
individual disputes. Indeed, it could be argued that the use of the term “clarify” here 
widens the general roles of panels and AB and enables them to provide “guidance” 
to the Members’ future conducts under the covered agreements.116  
Second, the panel is under an explicit obligation to “address the relevant 
provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the 
dispute”.117 This means that, even if a provision cited by a party turns out to be 
inapplicable because the issue is moot, the panel still has to address it. Otherwise, the 
panel could well be accused of failing to fulfil its obligation under Article 7.2 and 11, 
especially if the AB decides to overturn the panel’s finding that the specific provision 
is inapplicable.  
Third, Article 17.12 imposes similar obligation on the AB with even more 
explicit language by requiring the AB to “address each of the issues raised in 
accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.” Again, failure to 
 
115 Mission of the United States, supra note 2, at p. 13.  
116 Sacerdoti (2006, p. 49). 
117 DSU, Art. 7.2.  
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comply with the obligation could expose the AB to allegations of violations of its 
duties under the DSU. 
Fourth, more importantly, even for issues or provisions not raised by the parties, 
neither Article 7 nor Article 17 prohibits the panel or the AB from considering or 
ruling on such issues. To the contrary, as every lawyer knows, they often need to 
consider the unnamed provisions in order to assess the contexts of the provisions at 
issue in the litigation. One might argue that such a restriction can be found under 
Article 17.6, which states that “[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered 
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” However, this 
provision at best only delineates what may be appealed by the parties to the dispute, 
but it does not impose restrictions on what the AB may rule upon. Even though 
Article 17.12 refers to Article 17.6, one cannot conclude that the AB is thus subject 
to the same restriction as it only states that “[t]he Appellate Body shall address each 
of the issues raised in accordance with [Article 17.6]”. To the contrary, had the 
Members intended to also limit the power of the AB, they would have used the same 
language as Article 17.6 here by stating that “the rulings of the Appellate Body shall 
be limited to issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate 
proceeding.”  
To sum up, as the discussions above have illustrated, the covered agreements do 
not provide any basis for the prohibition of dicta or advisory opinion. Thus, if 
anything, the AB’s announcement on so-called “dicta” in panel and AB reports is 
nothing but dictum on dicta. This approach is dangerous not only because it lacks 
legal basis in the covered agreements, but also because it could backfire when 
Members in turn borrow the term and accuse the AB itself of rolling out dicta or 
“advisory opinion”, which is exactly what the U.S. has done in the reappointment 
saga.  
4. Disruptive Construction or Constructive Destruction? 
To sum up the discussions above, the U.S. criticisms against the AB are only 
half correct. It is true, as they have claimed, that the WTO does not have a formal 
precedent system. However, this also means that their allegations of dicta or advisory 
opinions are unwarranted.  
Now even if we were to take a step back, and assume, for the sake of the 
argument, that both of the U.S. claims are correct. Does this then justify the approach 
the US has been taking on the issue? To senior U.S. officials, the answer has always 
been yes. For example, Dennis Shea, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, stated that “for 
more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the U.S. has been 
raising serious concerns with the AB’s disregard for the rules set by WTO 
Members.”118 However, nobody paid any attention for all those years. Thus, as USTR 
Robert Lighthizer put it, blocking AB appointments is “the only leverage [the U.S. 
 
118 Mission of the United States, supra note 18, at p. 12. 
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has] with the WTO”,119 because, according to Shea, “the discussion of WTO reform 
would not have happened but for the disruptively constructive leadership of the 
United States”.120  
Many observers, however, have doubts as to whether the U.S. approach is really 
constructive. For example, while WTO Director General Robert Azevedo 
acknowledged that “some fruits [might] fall” when someone “begins to shake the tree 
pretty hard”, he also warned that “you don’t kill the tree by shaking it too hard”.121 
In my view, even if the U.S. does not kill the AB, its approach is still quite destructive, 
as it will create a bad “precedent” of holding the AB hostage, and other countries 
could follow suit in the future. At the same time, it is also worth pointing out that the 
U.S. approach is not really constructive at all, because it fails to address the root of 
the problem: the inability of the legislative branch to reach decisions. Thus, even if 
the U.S. approach worked, which is highly unlikely, it would only create bad “dicta” 
as changes at the AB would not contribute to resolving the WTO decision-making 
crisis.  
How, then, should we solve the AB crisis? In a recent paper,122 former AB 
Member Prof. Jennifer Hillman provided three approaches to fix the AB, which she 
called respectively as: 
1. The Good, i.e., to have a separate system for trade remedies, which involves 
either creating “a special AB to hear only appeals of trade remedy Decisions” or 
abolishing appeals from panel decisions in trade remedies cases; 
2. The Bad, i.e., to bypass the AB process and channel appeals through the 
Arbitration proceeding under DSU Article 25; 
3. The Ugly, i.e., to “fix the procedural matters readily fixable, run the 
selection process and then appoint new members by vote”. 
While I agree that the three options are the most likely solutions, I differ in my 
preferences among the three approaches. In my view, the first option is far from 
“Good”. If anything, it is a rather “Bad” solution as it defeats the very purpose of 
having an AB, which is to provide a set of uniform jurisprudence on WTO law. If the 
U.S. can have a special AB for trade remedies cases, what prevents other WTO 
Members from requesting special AB chambers for other issues, such as SPS & TBT 
cases for the EU, or intellectual property rights cases for China? On the other hand, 
the second option is not really that “Bad”, but it could turn “Ugly” in many cases. 
This is because Article 25 itself states that “resort to arbitration shall be subject to 
mutual agreement of the parties”. If a Member already wins at the Panel stage, why 
 
119 James Lankford: Senator Lankford Attends Finance Committee Hearing on the World Trade 
Organization (12 Mar 2019). Market Screener. https://www.marketscreener.com/news/James -
Lankford-Senator-Lankford-Attends-Finance-Committee-Hearing-on-the-World-Trade-Organizat 
ion--28155024/?utm_medium=RSS&utm_content=20190312. 
120  The WTO: Looking Forward (12 Oct 2018). Ctr for Strategic Int Stud. https://ww 
w.csis.org/events/wto-looking-forward. 
121 Donnan S and Baschuk B (2018) Trump’s Threat to Leave the WTO Could Be a Saving Grace, 
Bloomberg Businessweek. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-12/trump-s-threat-
to-leave-the-wto-could-be-a-saving-grace.  
122 Hillman J, Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body: the 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly?. Geo U Law Ctr, https://georgetown.box.com/s/966hfv0smran4m 
31biblgfszj42za40b. Accessed 18 Mar 2019. 
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would it agree to arbitration at the risk of losing its victory? Moreover, as such 
arbitrations are handled by ad hoc arbitration panels, they would not produce a 
consistent jurisprudence as the AB.  
As to the last option, while Hillman did recognize that it could be “potentially 
beautiful”, she argued that it can turn “Ugly” as resorting to voting would break the 
WTO’s long-standing consensus tradition and raise legitimacy concerns about the 
AB and its members appointed this way. In my view, however, this is exactly why 
this option is “Good”. It is not a “Bad” option as it is legally available under the 
existing WTO rules. Moreover, it avoids the “Ugly” implications arising from the 
first two options, such as raising the consensus needed to pass the DSU amendments 
or getting the two disputing parties to agree to arbitration.  
Moreover, given the urgency of the AB crisis, I would go even one step further 
than the Hillman proposal by suggesting that WTO Members should just jump start 
the appointment process by forcing a vote through the General Council without 
addressing the procedural issues first, as that would only further delay the process. I 
understand that such a move would be highly controversial. To start with, one could 
argue that consensus is the only decision-making rule under the DSU as Article 3.4 
provides that “[w]here the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the 
DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus”. Therefore, the argument goes, 
you can not resort to anything other than consensus. In response, I would cite to 
Article IX.1 of the WTO Agreement, which provides that, “[t]he WTO shall continue 
the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. Except as 
otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter 
at issue shall be decided by voting.” This confirms the availability of voting when 
consensus is not possible. As it has not been “otherwise provided” under the DSU, 
voting should be available for the AB appointment issue too.  
Again, one could counter that it has been “otherwise provided”, as the footnote 
to Article IX.1 provides that “[d]ecisions by the General Council when convened as 
the Dispute Settlement Body shall be taken only in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.” As DSU Article 
2.4 only refers to consensus, this means that voting is not possible. My response to 
this argument is twofold: 
First, to solve the conflict between the two provisions, we can refer to Article 
XVI.3 of the WTO Agreement, which provides that “[i]n the event of a conflict 
between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
conflict.” Applying this conflict rule to the current situation, the voting rules under 
Art. IX.1 of the WTO Agreement would apply. 
Some might argue that the conflict rule doesn’t apply here, as it is the WTO 
Agreement itself which states that the only decision-making rule applicable to the 
DSB is DSU Article 2.4. Thus, there is no conflict between the WTO Agreement and 
the DSU, and the special rules under the footnote to Article IX.1 shall apply as per 
the lex specialis rule. This brings up my second point, which is that the General 
Council should take over the issue from the DSB and make a decision. The legal basis 
for such action can be found under Article IV of the WTO Agreement, which 
provides the following: 
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1: The Ministerial Conference shall have the authority to take decisions on 
all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, if so requested 
by a Member, in accordance with the specific requirements for decision-
making in this Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement. 
2: In the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, its 
functions shall be conducted by the General Council.  
3: The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the 
responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. 
In other words, as the Ministerial Conference has the authority to decide all 
matters under any WTO Agreement, and the General Council assumes the functions 
of the Ministerial Conference when the latter is not in session, the General Council 
has the authority to decide issues under the DSU as well. This has happened in the 
past, such as the debate over amicus briefs in 2001 and the more recent discussions 
on AB selection in 2018.123  
To sum up, my suggestion for solving the AB crisis is very simple. The Members 
shall first put the issue of AB appointment on the agenda of the meeting of General 
Council, then try to have the issue decided by consensus. If the U.S. does not block 
the consensus, then all is well. If, however, the U.S. decides to continue its blockage, 
the Members can invoke the voting provisions under Article IX.1, which provides 
that “[d]ecisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken 
by a majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the 
relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement”. As there is no special majority requirement 
for this issue, the matter can be decided by simple majority, which is much easier to 
obtain than the two-third majority requirement for DSU amendments124 or the three-
fourth majority requirement for official interpretations. 125  The U.S. will not be 
pleased, but will they withdraw from the WTO as some people fear? In a recent 
statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Lighthizer stated that “[t]he 
WTO is a valuable institution, and offers many opportunities for the United States to 
advance our interests on trade. As I have said before, if we did not have the WTO, 
we would need to invent it.”126 Thus, notwithstanding angry threats from President 
Donald Trump to the contrary,127 it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would pull out. 
 
123 Hillman, id. at p. 13. See also WTO General Council, Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre 
William Rappard on November 22, 2000, WT/GC/M/60 (22 Nov 2000). 
124 WTO Agreement, Art. X.1. 
125 WTO Agreement, Art. IX.1.  
126 R. E. Lighthizer, Testimony of Robert E. Lighthizer before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (12 Mar 2019), https://www.financ 
e.senate.gov/download/03122019-lighthizer-testimony.  
127 C. Wang, Trump Threatens to Withdraw from World Trade Organization, CNBC (30 Aug 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/30/trump-threatens-to-withdraw-from-world-trade-organiza 
tion.html.  
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Meanwhile, the blockage problem will be solved, and an invaluable lesson will be 
taught to other Members which might contemplate the same course of action. 
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